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Abstract 
The subject of this paper aims to present in a “sui generis” manner a point of view on the relationship between two models of 
the social-human typology: Homo Oeconomicus and Homo Academicus. Reviewing some of the most approved views on 
theoretical and conceptual aspects, the limits of the two human types presented are not exhaustive, but is a starting point that 
can answer to questions like: “How far can go the convergence between academics and economics?”, “There are constraints 
or favorite elements in the relationship between Homo Oeconomicus and Homo Academicus?” Study approach, developed by 
the hypothesis ("Education fuels economy and shaping the society") to the conclusion (Homo Academicus is deeply involved 
in Mundus Oeconomicus, while Homo Oeconomicus stimulates a comprehensive way across Mundus Academicus), generate 
different approaches of paradigms and metamorphosis of the two human types analyzed, leading inevitably to shape postulate 
that humanity cannot ignore the "Development through Innovation, Innovation through Education" and that leads to an 
absolutely justified interrogation for the globalized present: Will be able Homo Academicus to adapt to the values of Homo 
Oeconomicus, sell its know-how and produce conveniently? 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Lumen Research Center in Social and Humanistic Sciences, Asociatia 
Lumen. 
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1. Introduction 
As is well-known, homo oeconomicus and homo academicus are expressions of a modern civilization that has 
managed to become more self-aware (Nomen est Omen! – The Name is the Man!).  
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Today, the modern man is not aware of history or his own history. Whoever believes that history includes only 
the past and its works is wrong because the ubiquitous reality is not only “alpha” or “omega,” but “caput mundi.” 
Today, the man himself is reported not only at the level of tribe, community or civilization, but is reported 
globally and universally; following the flow of information which has exponentially expanded the social sphere, 
teaching him to self-promote, to cultivate and to expand typology. The reason that we are witnessing the 
fragmentation of current civilization in favor of the adoption of unique values is due to the fact of typologies 
transmission from one community and one civilization to another. Will Man be able to function better in social 
terms as part of a uniform structure of meanings or will multipolarity destroy him? Transmission of social 
patterns can only be closer to the social individuals, communities and civilizations, to create a unique 
environment in which to develop. 
From all the literature put forward by examination of the two human types, one feature is that the components 
of each can be expanded and extended to the other, although not always and not just in any way. This is because 
between the "requiem" for homo oeconomicus and the "atavistic" metamorphosis of homo academicus, there 
looms an unavoidable "conflagration" of compromise: the bidirectional transfer to the individual personality of a 
multipolar DNA, that is an unpredictable alloy between (eco) NOMOS and (aca) DEMOS. In the context of 
globalization this operation of the transfer is "live": each of the two is an extension of the other in its own entity 
which establishes and configures its NOMOS of the DEMOS' perspective. 
2. Dilemmas and paradoxes 
2.1. Homo Oeconomicus: total man or caricature? 
Homo oeconomicus embodies a set of descriptive and normative idiosyncratic theorems fit to the trends of the 
natural and social reality, which gives rise to a concept, particularly circumscribed by social reality, which 
underlies his particular way of describing and explaining economic realities. From the total man of Adam Smith 
to Mill's homo oeconomicus, to the homo oeconomicus computans of Jevons and Edgeworth, to homo 
oeconomicus moralistic or behavioralis, our character gradually weakened (became more absent) during the 
nineteenth century. The Smithean man is a complex mixture of preferences, talents, inclinations and motivations, 
all grafted onto personal interest; he is total man (Pohoa , 2011, pp.81-82), caught in the framework of a 
quintuple perfection: perfectly rational, perfectly selfish, perfectly free, perfectly competitive, perfectly social 
(Popescu, 2009, pp.184-185). 
It is almost universally considered that the main characteristic of homo oeconomicus is his rationality, but the 
concept is evolving. If we consider only this side, rationality in economics is only applying personal interest, and 
then we can see two serious consequences: internal consistency and reasonableness election decision-making 
procedures. As we know, the marginal revolution has placed economic choice (especially between goods) in the 
centre of economic behaviour. However, while Jevons was concerned in his analysis about how these decisions 
are taken, the nature of these decisions has received little attention from him. Beyond that, Jevons' exposure was 
limited: there was no way to choose between equal utility and valued goods. Although Jevons’ "mathematical" 
hypostasis of homo oeconomicus is widely accepted as the basis of neoclassical economics in the twentieth 
century, not all marginalist economists have followed the path of the utilitarianism or mathematical version of the 
new homo oeconomicus (Schabas, 1990). By making choices at the expense of dominant wishes, economists of 
the twentieth century have allowed homo oeconomicus to have any motivation, allowing him to choose 
rationally, in other words, to become homo oeconomicus rationalis. 
In more recent years, it has become apparent that homo oeconomicus rationalis is not as strong a character as 
the economists of the 1970s believed. It seems that, following laboratory results from experimental economics 
and game theory, economists have found good reasons to think that the definition of the rationality and 
consistency of homo oeconomicus could be relaxed and loosened. These widespread developments still take 
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homo oeconomicus rationalis as ideal model, but then analyze what the effect might be on the experimental 
results, if he, homo oeconomicus, would not be as perfectly rational as pictured. 
Secondly, it seems that with the old economic issues (competition, markets, general equilibrium theory, etc.) 
rationality on its own will not get one very far. As Knight (1941) pointed out and as is recently argued by Arrow 
(1986), the individual rationality of homo oeconomicus must be combined with other basic principles (dogmas or 
doctrines) of modern economy (e.g. other assumptions for perfect competition and general equilibrium) to obtain 
stronger results, even though the justification for this characterization was its ability to provide accurate 
analytical results. Third, attempts to use a human individual as a rational representative agent to support 
macroeconomic theory has been proven to be an incorrect conception (Kirman, 1992). Finally, attempts were 
made to change the basic characterization of the rationality of homo oeconomicus, but, paradoxically, it cannot 
be dissociated from the moral, psycho-behavioural analysis of the individual (Sen, 1977; Simon, 1976). 
Utilitarian theory seems to be very important in determining the moral, immoral or amoral character of homo 
oeconomicus. Utilitarianism, initiated officially by Jeremy Bentham, restructured from its classical form by John 
Stuart Mill, adopts a consequential perspective, according to which a good deed is not defined by the intentions 
behind its origin or the purpose pursued by the agent, but by its effects or consequences (Scarre, 1996). 
Regardless of utilitarian calculations, economics as a whole, through its representatives, accredits as an 
overarching idea that people are motivated by their own welfare when taking economic measures. It is a well-
known image of homo oeconomicus that describes the entity as concerned with the maximization of rational self-
interest. However, economic behaviour is more complex than this statement suggests because people have 
different motivations that determine their choices whether rationally or irrationally (sometimes under uncertainty) 
or their economic actions in relation to a moral – immoral antithesis (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
Economy does not pretend that purposive rationality (maximize your wealth) is the only feature of human 
action. It also recognizes the human being as a moral being, a creature able to distinguish right from wrong, but 
morality does not have a purely economic meaning. Moral attitudes (broadly understood) not only motivate the 
behaviour of homo oeconomicus, but it also empowers them. Therefore, homo oeconomicus is amoral because 
his actions have universal applicability (Dierksmeier & Pirson, 2009) and are motivated by the needs in the lower 
level of Maslow's hierarchy. In this regard the concept of homo oeconomicus, representing the HOW against the 
WHAT, must include actions with broad applicability. 
In characterizing the human self as essentially selfish and his rationality enslaved by the passions described by 
Hume, neoclassicism effectively addresses ethical irrational behaviour. This is a contrast between predominantly 
selfish rational behaviour and irrational altruism, which is again a paradox! But Sen is not ready to accept this. 
Intermediate relations located between concern for self and concern for others are ignored. There are groups 
acting as intermediaries between the person and society as a whole, each relying on the loyalty of its members in 
such a way that the relationship between personal sacrifice and personal fulfillment is a matter more complicated 
than that permitted by a narrow selfishness. Thus, for Sen (1988), the real issue is "whether there is a multitude of 
reasons, or, if self-interest is the only one that leads human beings" (p.19). In our opinion, however, as long as 
altruism corresponds to internalized externalities and the autonomy of an individual is, in fact, the ability to self-
constraint (that is, the prioritization of preferences which is not only determined by their inclination), even under 
the assumption of maximizing profit with minimum resources, homo oeconomicus cannot be viewed as immoral 
because morality is not an economic constraint. This does not exclude immoral actions in certain contexts.  
This leads to the psychological economy and behavioural economics that is concerned with how systematic 
differences in the actions of those homines oeconomici (operated by three factors: limited rationality, limited 
personal interest and concept of marginal utility) influence human behaviour in general and the ethical in 
particular by the famous abnormalities decision (Elster, 1998). Whatever model is proposed, whether 
holographic, magnetic resonance imaging, cloning or other methods of experimental research, behavioural 
economics suggests that the homo oeconomicus model can be detected in two types, depending on the rules of 
fairness and altruism, but excludes the assertion that people are able to correctly calculate the consequences of 
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decisions taken; in both cases, the level of rationality is significantly lower, but never subject to unethical 
decisions (Loewenstein, 1992). 
Can homo oeconomicus be considered a total man? One attempt as least has been made to answer this. Of 
course, looking at the above and based on systematic reviews presented in the literature (Dixon, 2010) the 
affirmative answer may seem bold, perhaps subjective. Perfection of the individual and thus of the human models 
he created them or who joined discussed various registries, multidisciplinary, was not confirmed by anyone. In 
contrast, imperfection seems much closer to the truth. If we look at Adam Smith and the image he created for our 
character, total man would have enough arguments. Evolution of the concept, the idea, the abstraction, and finally 
the model of homo oeconomicus and the undeniable presence quota complicates things, and our character is more 
"scar", not lack of affection and impeccability. Our character, as it developed, had the non posse mori and not 
posse non mori; in other words, he did not have the instruments necessary to oppose the changes that were 
imposed on him by the very same environment that created him.  Homo oeconomicus cannot be a total man, as 
Adam Smith outlined perfectly, but rather is a whole man.  
However, can homo oeconomicus be considered, in its entirety, a caricature? Considering the truth that a 
caricature based on the artist's subjective vision which not only simplifies but is based on distortion or 
exaggeration of certain features beyond objective truth, we are obliged to recognize that it is this distortion or 
exaggeration that allows us to recognize the true significance of the exaggerated characteristic. The same is true 
for homo oeconomicus. He is not only a simplification of man, as all models of homines are, but he is also a 
caricature, because it is reduced to the essential features of economic behaviour. As the caricature appeared and 
evolved gradually from one generation to another, economists became less concerned with real-life 
representation model elements and more concerned with his idealization to emphasize the role/roles in economic 
theory. Once economists had a more accurate representation, or more concrete description of homo oeconomicus, 
they were free to choose a more subjective perspective in portraying their favourite character. This caricature 
model of the man that economists have portrayed, is what helps them to learn about idealized theoretical 
economy, and they do this because it allows them to explore human economic behaviour and its consequences in 
different (exaggerated or not) forms. This abstracted model, the caricature of homo oeconomicus, seems strange 
and sometimes ridiculous to other social science researchers, but a paradox was needed; this is precisely why 
economists, in their model apology, argue that the success of analytical comparisons becomes exactly the same 
representatives of social sciences when they include the homo oeconomicus model in their work. And the 
paradox goes further: compared analytically, homo oeconomicus becomes malleable and transforms itself by way 
of that research because, if it were so inflexible, it would not be able to be a good model worthy of consideration. 
Although economists have come to depend on their caricature, the dilemma’s essential response (total man or 
caricature?) is clear: no one can deny the value of caricature in building an accurate picture. 
2.2. Homo academicus: between archetypal image and sociological anthropology  
Although some historians, even ethnographers, have often wondered why there are consistent, systematic 
considerations related to this concept, based on the origin and evolution of it we find that the failure is 
paradoxical the more so because, as Harold Perkin notes, comprising academics is the key model for all homines: 
the homo academicus professional launches all others  (Rothblatt, 2006). 
Specifically, the syntagma homo academicus is found in the form that we use it today, only in the last century, 
when the famous sociologist Pierre Bourdieu entitled one of his works, a book published in 1984, only using that 
syntagma: Homo Academicus. Since then and until today the term has been used either in marginal comments on 
that paper or in the subsequent approach of higher education and its many angles of analysis of the contemporary 
period (a period of Urbi et Orbi academic education expansion), where it meets the invariably English 
correspondent of the syntagma, The Academic Man, also the name of a book written by Logan Wilson in 1995 
“The Academic Man - A Study in the Sociology of a Profession” and his analysis is also in sociological register.  
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Although the syntagma homo academicus has not yet found a place of honour among its counterparts in other 
areas or the taxonomic inventory of homines, paradoxically or not, we speak rather of multiple representatives of 
the "family" of homo academicus: it is homo discens (teaching man, man who represent the human capacity to 
learn and assimilate through education) and homo educanus (man who is educated, studious man, one who 
instructs man as representative of human needs of education before they reach adulthood), but also homo 
grammaticus (the learner, pupil, student, apprentice school), homo imitans (who learns by imitation from an 
educator), homo investigans (researcher man, curious, endowed with the ability to learn by inference), homo 
creator (creator man, endowed with the capacity to be creative), homo noeticus (man endowed with the ability to 
think), homo universalis  (universal man, who has many and varied knowledge) and, of course, homo sapiens 
(wise man, smart man); all of them are brought into question, especially when talking about the history of higher 
education and academia, and their role in human society. We should not overlook the fact that another paradox 
occurs when we talk about homo academicus and his beginning: can his manifestation be considered as 
belonging to a profession? Does he belong to a statistical inventory or to administrative jobs? Or is homo 
academicus a model that requires mission by vocation? 
Bourdieu's theoretical framework explores the active relationship between the individual and his social 
environment (Grenfell 2004). Relationship capital is crucial if homo academicus’ academic strength and power is 
derived from intellectual academic capital (hierarchy of institutional management) and intellectual capital 
(scientific reputation based on research) (Kloot, 2009). The relationship between habitus, fields and capital is not 
a symbolic one, because the interconnections between them led to the differentiation of economic capital (which 
is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights) 
from the cultural capital (which is convertible, under certain conditions, into economic capital and may be 
institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications) and the social (which refers to social connections and 
may be convertible, under certain conditions, into economic capital and institutionalized in the form of titles of 
nobility) (Bourdieu, 1988). Homo academicus includes all three forms of capital: 
 Cultural - the distribution of knowledge and information, education and its official qualifications, skills 
development and writing of books and other cultural activities  
 Economic - through participation in various research grants and their direct applicability in the economy  
 Social - through social connections, family or in different communities and individual forms of prestige or 
reputation 
 Applying Bourdieu's theory to the homo academicus model led to the concept of academic habitus which 
converges in interactions between cultural, academic, intellectual, social and economic capital. Systematically, 
Bourdieu was wondering if it is reasonable to apply economic laws in different environments, such as the 
academic, in time and space. Every time, he responded not only by critical epistemological and methodological 
assumptions of the anthropological theory of rational choice, but more importantly, the conceptualization of 
economic theory in defining various forms of academic habitus capital (Hirsch, Stuart & Friedman, 1990, pp.42-
44; Lindenberg, 1990, p.733). 
3. Homo Oeconomicus and Homo Academicus: are they dependent, independent or independent? 
Reiterating the statement in the beginning of our approach, we can ask whether we participate effectively in 
requiem or metamorphosis? Who and what borrows from the other? Both are developed and are problematic and 
paradoxical, but they fail to align themselves, as they are sometimes symbiotic, sometimes opposite; so that, 
regardless of how they have been shaped and re-shaped, sized and re-sized, abstracted and materialized, 
individualized or generalized, the one or the other have represented humanity in theses and antitheses in various 
ways that we have tried to describe in our approach, and to summarize as follows:  
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 The concept of homo oeconomicus places emphasis on individualistic preferences, while the concept of homo 
academicus emphasizes the concepts of habitus, capital and social norms. 
 Homo oeconomicus is unencumbered or unrestricted by any personal relationships (and can maximize profits 
even under selfishness or altruism) while homo academicus is more interdependent (he not only self-educated 
but has a mission to educate). 
 Homo oeconomicus oscillates between perfectly rational decisions and irrationality, while homo academicus 
subscribes to ontology in which rationality is sine qua non, but that does not necessarily mean a purely rational 
constitution. 
 Homo oeconomicus is driven by self-interest (sometimes in the manner ... aut Caesar aut nihil!), while homo 
academicus tries to fulfill its social role, with maximum responsibility toward all men. 
 Like homo oeconomicus, homo academicus is not purely self-interested, neither perfectly rational, and is 
driven by social forces that are often beyond its ability to control. 
As with homo oeconomicus, homo academicus cannot avoid philosophical problems, and this is a first critical 
point. For example, how could homo academicus reconcile self-interest and his social role? When homo 
academicus struggles with self-interest and the obligations of its role and its mission, what will he choose, and 
how will his choice be classified? Since homo academicus cannot have only selfish interests, or not to as great a 
degree as homo oeconomicus, his behaviour is more complex. Being an over-socialized character, he seems 
overwhelmingly driven by rules. He does not deviate from his character's morality to a greater degree than homo 
oeconomicus, yet still retains the freedom to act in a self-interested manner when it is outside of the academic 
community; this is because there seems to be no criterion to ascertain how homo academicus makes choices 
between rules and individual interests. Another critical point is the ability to offer two explanations for economic 
interactions, namely academic. Can they do it better than each does for its own field? Sociologists have examined 
classical economics, neoclassical economics, the new institutionalist economics, economics of transaction cost 
and sociological anthropology, advancing the idea that with only a few exceptions, people's behaviour is 
profoundly affected by social relations, but that economic actions are embedded in social relations. However, 
homo academicus, as a sociological construct, is more complex than homo oeconomicus, and it is therefore 
difficult to outline his behaviour. 
From this point of view, the two homines seem not to have a conciliatory relationship because the axiomatic 
roots of socio-economics consist in the personal interest of each individual, regardless of his identity. The 
powerful nature of homo oeconomicus is inconsistent with the concept of homo academicus, where the man and 
his concern for society are inseparable. And while sociology is concerned with the role and identity of the man, 
the economy, on the other hand, is not. Economics does not offer philosophical notions of what man is. While 
homo oeconomicus is considered as the whole man, homo academicus is a superior man. Notwithstanding this, 
without minimizing the value of each, their descriptions and supporting arguments have changed over time, 
transforming each of the hominess, and both have survived, being adapted by the real world under the 
imperatives of globalization, whether individually or by certain levels of confluence. 
Oscillating between neo-liberal economic concepts and historical academic traditions, invariably adapting to 
changes imposed by new global socio-economic realities under the impression of multiculturalism and the 
interactions of legislation, strategies, visions and macro-structural trends, the two homines multiplied new 
paradigms and concepts. Placed within the myriad possibilities of the event horizon, with both forward and 
backward conceptualization permanently oriented to history and the future, they must behave intrinsically in 
masks. And nobody can say they lack the sacrifice of the essence of globalism (phenomenology, ideology, 
existential reality) requiring a human manifestation intermixture today, a plenipotentiary mundus oeconomicus. 
The path of Platon’s Academy from magistrorum Universitas et scholarium (community of professors and 
students) to multiversity, open university and e-learning has known the reactions of Humboldtian or Cardinal 
Newman’s transformations in the 19th century, that still remain structurally defining (Stromquist et al., 2007).  
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The biography of academic education, dotted with medieval paradigms and mechanisms that trigger 
archetypal roles in a typical scholastic University, under the influence of homo oeconomicus’ fierce 
manifestation, re-designed functions and roles for the modernized University, revealed in new paths and borders 
for mundus academicus. A very subtle change takes place in the world, where earlier national and cultural roles 
of higher education were eclipsed by "economic reason". Roles are reversed or coexist peacefully, so that homo 
oeconomicus preaching “time and no time” the authorial prescribed recipe for omnia erga Universitasis (to 
preserve, develop and streamline their role at a local university, multiversity) and re-create the homo academicus 
into mundus academicus. Being redefined with an implacable symbiotic destiny (homo academicus provides 
solutions, homo oeconomicus implements them) requires that the academic world not only to responds to 
changes, but also to initiates them (Pohoa  & H l ngescu, 2012). 
Thus, in the relationship homo oeconomicus vs. homo academicus, simplistically we would say that the first 
does not understand the other: homo oeconomicus cannot understand the concept of power or to absorb cultural 
capital concepts, cultural reproduction or academic habitus; however, in magnificence and self-sufficiency, he 
sees mundus academicus as the engine of economic growth, and homo academicus sometimes as rigid but 
splendid in his tenacity to handle this engine. And the secret of this tenacity lies in increasing the strength of his 
ability to transfer research into industry, inventions and patents and to generate new ones. And this is where 
mundus academicus assimilates in a win-win manner the attribute of "innovation engine" and the ability to 
commercialize research, offering wider economy and society multibeneficial results. And what is clear is that, 
currently, homo academicus is heavily involved in mundus oeconomicus, while homo oeconomicus stimulates the 
whole mundus academicus (Pohoa  & H l ngescu, 2012). 
4. Conclusions 
The conceptual construction of this paper was to outline the profiles of two socio-human types, in terms of 
how they have been shaped, sized, interpreted and re-interpreted by several economists or sociologists. We have 
seen that economic thinking, sometimes accordant, sometimes opposite, has designed the main subject of study - 
the homo oeconomicus and its actions - in a wide range of analysis as a representative of a community-led 
tranche of economic principles that coexist in an evolving mix of classic to neo-classical utilitarianism, from 
marginalism and the radicalism of metaphysical realism, objectivity and logical positivism, to ethical egoism and 
metaphysical libertarianism.  
The doctrinal supremacy of the individual that rationally maximizes their individual utility, was maintained in 
the universal image of man, but it was not free from mutations in the realm of other Humanities disciplines. 
Producing and consuming, homo oeconomicus has been the workhorse in the history of political economy since 
its introduction in the area of doctrine by Adam Smith. In today's times, the profile was supplemented with quasi-
psychic faculties, a monadic vehicle capable of advanced utility calculations that can be improved by them, 
stripped of all historical contamination, emptied of all material specifications, and so abstract and general that 
invariably would be applicable everywhere, for everyone and at all times. 
Homo oeconomicus is the acrobat of mundus oeconomicus, an acrobat who performs favourite acrobatics - 
supply and demand - in the trapezius of econometrics, and is not always sure that the safeguard of welfare may 
provide him with the comfort of rational choice, because it can help him ignore his inclinations, dispositions and 
preferences: it is driven or limited by the theory of moral sentiments or ophelimity; he is paradoxical and 
dilemmatic and becomes an idea, a caricature and contingent reality. He is now more present in behavioural 
economics. Imperceptibly he turned into a selfish but rational actor, driven by a natural desire to acquire, at any 
cost, as much possible, and what began as a theoretical model was completed in a true economic anthropology, 
sociology and psychology: homo oeconomicus became a whole man. 
His colleague from our analysis, homo academicus, has not experienced the same journey. Although from the 
idealized image of humanistic philosophy until today, experts were presented with a bearable dilemma: does it 
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manifest in a profession, belong to a statistical inventory or administrative jobs, or ontology of a mission by 
vocation? As we pointed out, the Humboldtian vision or that of Cardinal Newman have almost bipolarized the 
diachronic approach of his socio-human profile, although these concept postulates did not give us an in depth or 
complete picture. The portrait took shape through the perspective of sociological considerations, and these 
considerations have proved that homo academicus is the superior man, as one providing solutions to all others, so 
that he is primus inter pares. 
Acknowledgements 
This work was supported by the European Social Fund in Romania, under the responsibility of the Managing 
Authority for the Sectorial Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013 (grant 
POSDRU/CPP 107/DMI 1.5/S/78342). 
References 
Arrow, K. J. (1986). Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System. The Journal of Business, 59 (4/2), S385-S399. 
Bourdieu, P. (1998). Homo Academicus. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Dierksmeier, C., & Pirson, M. (2009). Oikonomia Versus Chrematistike.Learning from Aristotle about the Future Orientation and Business 
Management. Journal of Business Ethics, 88, 417-430. 
Dixon, J. (2010). Naive neoclassical economics and the promised land of privatization: A critical deconstruction of homo 
economicus. Administrative Theory & Praxis, 32(3), 348-372 
Elster, J. (1998). Emotions and Economic Theory. Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVI, 47-74. 
Grenfell, M. (2004). Pierre Bourdieu, Agent Provocateur. London: Continuum International Publishing Group. 
Hirsch, P., Stuart, M., & Friedman, R. (1990).  Clean Models vs. Dirty Hands: Why Economics Is Different from Sociology. In S. Zukin & P. 
DiMaggio (Eds.), Structures of Capital: The Social Organization of the Economy (pp.39-56). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, Econometrica, XLVII, 263-291. 
Kirman, A. P. (1992). Whom or What Does the representative Individual Represent?. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(2), 117-136. 
Kloot, B. (2009). Exploring the Value of Bourdieu’s framework in the context of institutional change. Studies in Higher Education, 34(4), 
469-481. 
Knight, F. H. (1941). Anthropology and Economics. Journal of Political Economy, 49, 247–268. 
Lindenberg, S. (1990). Homo Socio-oeconomicus: The Emergence of a General Model of Man in the Social Sciences. Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics, 146, 727-748. 
Loewenstein, G. (1992). The Fall and Rise of Psychological Explanations in the Economics of Intertemporal Choice. In G. Loewenstein & J. 
Elster (Eds.), Choice Over Time (pp. 3–34). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Pohoa , I. (2011). Epistemologie i metodologie în tiin a economic . Bucure ti, Romania: Economic . 
Pohoa , I., & H l ngescu, C. (2012). Oeconomicus vs. Academicus: a diachronic perspective of the relationship between Kondratieff Cycles 
and the structural Reforms of Higher Education, Review of Economic and Business Studies, V (2), 13-32. 
Popescu, Ghe. (2009). Evolu ia gândirii economice (edi ia a IV-a). Bucure ti, Romania: C. H. Beck. 
Rothblatt, S. (2006). Education’s Abiding Moral Dilemma: merit and worth in the cross-Atlantic democracies, 1800-2006. Oxford: 
Symposium Books. 
Scarre, G. (1996). Utilitarianism. London: Routledge. 
Schabas, M. (1990). A World Ruled by Number. Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press. 
Sen, A. K. (1977). Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6, 317-344. 
Sen, A. K. (1988). The Concept of Development. In H. Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (Eds.), Handbook of Development Economics (pp. 9-26). 
Elsevier Ltd. 
Simon, H. A. (1976). From substantive to procedural rationality. In S. J. Latsis (Ed.), Method and Appraisal in Economics (pp.129 148). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Stromquist, N.P., Gil-Anton, M., Balbachevsky, E., Mabokela, R., Smolentseva, A., & Colatrella, C. (2007). The Academic Profession in the 
Globalization Age: Key Trends, Challenges and Possibilities. In P.G. Altbach and P.M. Peterson (Eds.), Higher Education in the New 
Century: Global Challenges and Innovative Ideas (pp.1-35). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
Wilson, L. (1995). The Academic Man: A Study in the Sociology of a Profession. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 
